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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court, in the course of its

constitutional determination as to the admissibility of the
earwitness identification testimony, erroneously admitted the
voice-identification testimony of numerous state's witnesses;
thereby depriving defendant of his constitutional rights to due
process.

The trial court's determination as to admissibility of

the voice-identification testimony is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) .

State

v.

Nelson,

950 P.2d 940, 942-43

Defendant preserved this issue by moving

to strike the voice-identification testimony of substantially all
of the law enforcement witnesses utilized by the State at trial
(See,

e.g., R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29);
2.

Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to request

a cautionary jury instruction that accurately reflected the Longfactors to be considered in the course of evaluating voiceidentification testimony, deprived defendant of his
6

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

To

make such a showing, Defendant must show, first, that counsel
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that
counsel's performance was prejudicial.
803 (Utah 1988) .
fact.

Strickland

Bundy

v. DeLand,

763 P.2d

Such claims present mixed questions of law and
v. Washington,

2052, 2070 (1984) .

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct.

When available, the appellate court defers to

the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its application
of legal principles to its factual findings for correctness.
State v.

Hay,

859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993).

Defendant need not

preserve this issue inasmuch as it can be raised for the first
time on appeal;
3.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish

Defendant's conviction of Attempted Escape.

When reviewing a

claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, the
appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict and
"assumes the jury believed the evidence and inferences that
support the verdict."
1993); see
State v.

also

Fisher,

State

State
v.

v.

Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah

Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992);

972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

words, the appellate court will affirm the jury verdict
7

In other
w/

if

there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made.'"
Booker,

Wood, 868 P.2d at 87-88 (quoting State

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)); see

also

State

946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied,
449 (Utah 1998) .

v.

v.

Hall,

953 P.2d

Defendant preserved this issue by virtue of his

opposition to the charge of Attempted Escape throughout the jury
trial.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case, among other things, involves the question of
whether the standards set forth for determining the reliability
of eyewitness testimony also apply to earwitness testimony.
Accordingly, this case involves the constitutional right of an
accused to have the trial court determine the constitutional
reliability of earwitness identifications prior to consideration
of the same by a jury.

8

In the instant case, Defendant was alleged to have
befriended another inmate, Mr. Calvin Slaugh, and, through the
course of that relationship, to have obtained information by
which Defendant attempted to be released from jail.

Defendant

was alleged to have utilized Mr. Slaugh's brother, Mr. Ralph
Slaugh, to unknowingly post bail on behalf of Defendant instead
of his brother, as intended.

Prior to completing the planned

bail, the scheme was discovered.
By way of Information, Defendant was charged with
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and Attempted Escape, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.

At

trial, Defendant's counsel objected to and moved to strike the
State's witnesses based on various unreliability grounds and the
circumstances surrounding their voice identification of
Defendant, which the trial court denied.

Further, the record

indicates that the State failed to establish the elements of the
charge of Attempted Escape beyond a reasonable doubt.

After

deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both
counts.
That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an
indeterminate term of on to fifteen years on the charge of
Communications Fraud, to be served consecutively with any other
9

charges Defendant serves, and one year in jail on the charge of
Attempted Escape.

On March 17, 1999, the trial court signed the

Judgment, which was entered that same day.

Defendant, through

appointed appellate counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on April 14,
1999.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case, among other things, involves questions

concerning unduly suggestive earwitness identifications
reliability determinations, or the lack thereof, of earwitness
testimony utilized at trial (See
26).

R. 103-04, Jury Instruction No.

Hence, this case involves questions surrounding the

constitutional right of an accused to have the trial court
properly determine the constitutional reliability of earwitness
identifications prior to consideration of the same by a jury;
2.

While as an inmate at the Davis County Jail, Defendant

allegedly befriended another inmate, Mr. Calvin Slaugh, and,
through the course of that relationship, obtained information by
which Defendant attempted to be released from jail by way of a
bond (See

R. 1-4, Information).

Defendant allegedly utilized Mr.

Slaugh's brother, Mr. Ralph Slaugh, to unknowingly post bail on
behalf of Defendant instead of his brother, as intended (See

10

id.

at R. 2-3);

Prior to release, the scheme was discovered (See

id.

at R. 4) ;
3.

By way of Information, Defendant was charged with

Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and Attempted Escape, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (See R. 14, Information);
4.

During trial, Defendant's counsel moved to strike the

testimony of Detective David Bremmer on the grounds that
Detective Bremmer's identification of Defendant's voice was based
on a conversation that he overheard between another detective and
Defendant subsequent to the charges being filed (See R. 171,
Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp. 203-04);
5.

Pursuant to the trial court's direction, Defendant's

trial counsel subsequently filed a motion to strike the testimony
of Detective David Bremmer because the circumstances surrounding
the testimony were impermissibly suggestive (See R. 61-62, Motion
to Strike Testimony of Detective Dave Bremer [sic] Regarding
Voice Identification).

The trial court failed to rule on

Defendant's motion;
6.

At trial, counsel objected to and moved to strike the

earwitness identifications of Defendant by various State's

11

witnesses as unduly suggestive and unreliable, which the trial
court denied (See R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29);
7.

On the charge of Attempted Escape, the trial court

instructed the jury that
Before you can convict the defendant
Joey Luis Silva of the crime of Attempted
Escape as charged in Count Two of the
Information, you must believe from the
evidence and a [sic] beyond a reasonable
doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.
That on or about the 1st day of August,
1998, the defendant, Joey Luis Silva, was
under arrest or in official custody in Davis
County, State of Utah, and
2.
That he attempted to leave
official
custody without authorization, and

3.
That he did so intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly.
(See R. 86, Jury Instruction No. 9) (Emphasis added);
8.

At trial, Mr. Todd Harris, the representative of the

bail bond company, testified that a person using Defendant's name
contacted him by telephone and arranged to have bail posted for
Defendant (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 159, lines 219).

The caller identified the cosigner of the bond as "Slaugh"

(See id. at R. 171, p. 159, lines 20-23);
9.

According to Mr. Harris' testimony, Mr. Slaugh called

and made arrangements to "bail out this Joey Silva." (See id. at
R. 171, p. 160, lines 5-13) . In light of the evidence presented

12

in the course of the trial, the State failed to establish the
elements of the charge of Attempted Escape beyond a reasonable
doubt;
10.

After its deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of

guilty on both counts (See R. 12 0, Verdict);
11.

That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to

an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years on the charge of
Communications Fraud, to be served consecutively with any other
charges Defendant serves, and one year in jail on the charge of
Attempted Escape (See R. 121, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah
State Prison; R. 142, Judgment);
12.

The trial court signed the Judgment on March 17, 1999,

which was entered that same day (See R. 142, Judgment, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to the Brief of Appellant as
Addendum A ) ;
13.

Defendant, through appointed appellate counsel, filed

Notice of Appeal on April 14, 1999 (See R. 147-150, Notice of
Appeal).

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

The standards set forth in Ramirez,

Lopez,

should apply to earwitness identification testimony.

and

Long

The trial

court, in the course of its constitutional determination as to

13

the admissibility of the State's earwitness identification
testimony, erroneously admitted the voice-identification
testimony and thereby deprived Defendant of his constitutional
rights to due process. According to the standards set forth in
Ramirez,

Lopez,

and Long,

the numerous voice-identifications by

the law enforcement officers in the instant case are
constitutionally unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. Hence,
under the facts of this case, the trial court erred by allowing
the jury to hear the voice-identification testimony of the
aforementioned law enforcement witnesses;
2.

By failing to request a cautionary jury instruction

about the earwitness testimony that reflected the similar factors
related to eyewitness identification testimony as set forth in
State

v. Long,

appointed trial counsel deprived Defendant of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Appointed trial counsel's failure to request such a cautionary
jury instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the
arguments and analogies made by counsel and the trial court
during trial.

But for trial counsel's deficient performance of

failing to request such a cautionary instruction, Mr. Silva would
have had the opportunity to have the jury advised about the

14

factors it should consider in the course of evaluating earwitness
identification testimony;
3.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish

Defendant's conviction for Attempted Escape inasmuch as there was
no evidence presented at trial to establish the element that
Defendant attempted to leave official custody without
authorization.

Even when the record evidence is viewed in the

light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there is not even
some evidence to establish or support the element that Defendant
attempted to leave official custody without authorization of the
jail.

Moreover, the State's own evidence establishes that the

alleged bond that was to be posted was in fact to be in the name
of Joey Silva.

ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION:

THE APPLICABILITY OF Ramirez AND Lopez
TO EARWITNESS TESTIMONY AND VOICE
IDENTIFICATIONS.

This case presents the apparent issue of first impression of
whether the standards for determining the reliability and
suggestiveness of eyewitness identifications as set forth in
State

v.

Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) and State

v.

Lopez,

886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), apply to earwitness testimony and
voice identifications as well.

In Ramirez,

15

the Utah Supreme

Court set forth the procedure to be followed and the factors to
be considered by a trial court in determining the reliability of
eyewitness testimony under the due process clause of the Utah
Constitution.1

Id.

at 778-84.

In the course of its analysis,

the Utah Supreme Court provided a broad overview of the law
surrounding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications,
which included a discussion about the separate and distinct roles
Id.

of the prosecutor, judge, and jury.
As set forth in Ramirez,

at 778.

"[t]he burden of demonstrating the

admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution" to
lay the requisite foundation.

Id.

Such a foundation is

necessary for the trial court to make the necessary preliminary
factual findings and legal conclusions concerning admissibility.
Id.2

The judge, "as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility

of an identification," is "required to scrutinize proffered
evidence for constitutional defects."
Nelson,

Id.;

see

950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

also

State

v.

If presented

with the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness identification,
the trial judge must preliminariliy determine whether the

*See Utah Const, art. I, § 7, which provides, "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
2,,

The defendant is entitled to a determination by the court
of the evidence's constitutional admissibility." State
v.
Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991).
16

identification is sufficiently reliable so as not to deny the
accused of due process if considered by the jury.
P.2d at 778.

Ramirez,

817

If admissible, the jury determines the weight to be

given to such evidence.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court, in the process of discussing the
roles of the judge and jury, expressed concern about the
"[p]otential for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional
guarantees inhere[nt] in th[e] overlap of responsibility of judge
and jury . . . "

Id.

Accordingly, the Court emphasized the need

for the trial court not to "abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional
defects . . . ."

Id.

Consequently, under Ramirez,

the trial

court must initially determine whether eyewitness testimony is
constitutionally reliable prior to it being admitted.
In determining whether an eyewitness identification is
constitutionally reliable, the trial court must consider the
following pertinent factors:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the

17

witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's.
Id.

at 781 (quoting State

1986)) .

v.

Long,

721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah

"The ultimate question to be determined is whether,

under the totatity of the circumstances, the identification was
reliable."

Id.

Because essentially the same concerns exist with respect to
earwitness identification as do in situations involving
eyewitness identifications, the standards set forth in

Ramirez

should likewise apply to earwitness identifications such as those
in the instant case.

Indeed, the trial court in the instant case

analogized earwitness identifications to eyewitness
identifications in the course of its determinations (See,

e.g.,

R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 436, lines 7-10).
In Lopez,

the Utah Supreme Court outlined the two-part test

utilized to determine whether a photo array was so suggestive
that subsequent admission of eyewitness testimony at trial
violates federal due process.

Lopez,

886 P.2d at 1111.

As the

court stated, "The first part of the test requires us to
determine whether the 'pretrial photographic identification
procedure used . . . was so impermissibly suggestive as to give

18

rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
Id.

misidentification.'"
435 (Utah 1989)).

(quoting State

v.

Thamer,

111 P.2d 432,

"The second part dictates that if the photo

array was impermissibly suggestive, any in-court eyewitness
identification 'must be based on [an] untainted, independent
Id.

foundation to be reliable.'"
According to the court,

xx

[i]n evaluating whether a pretrial

photo identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive under
the first part of the test, the main question is whether the
photo array emphasized the defendant's photo over the others."
Id.

Additionally, the court articulated some factors to consider

in the course of such an evaluation, which include "whether the
words and body language of the police officers who presented the
array conveyed an attitude of disinterest, whether the officers
manipulated the photos to indicate their belief that one of the
photos portrayed the perpetrator, and whether the photos
themselves were selected so that the defendant's photo stood out
from the rest."

Id.

at 1111-12.

As the instant case illustrates, the aforementioned

Lopez

two-part test for determining whether a pretrial photo
identification is unduly suggestive should also apply to pretrial
voice identifications.

At trial, Defendant's trial counsel

argued that the pretrial voice identification by substantially
19

all of the witnesses in the instant case was unduly suggestive in
violation of Defendant's due process rights (See, e.g.,

R. 172,

Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29).

I.

IN THE COURSE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EARWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE VOICE-IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY OF NUMEROUS STATE'S WITNESSES; THEREBY
DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS.

The trial court denied Mr. Silva of his constitutional
rights to due process by determining that the earwitness
identification testimony and voice identifications by several of
the State's witnesses at trial were admissible as a matter of
law.

Earlier in the week just prior to trial in the instant

case, Detective Bremmer held a conference in the Davis County
Attorney's Office during which numerous witnesses, who were
utilized at trial, together listened to various tapes containing
conversations that purportedly included Mr. Silva (See, e.g.,

R.

172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 438-39). 3

3

As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Defendant's
appointed trial counsel, pursuant to the trial court's direction,
filed a motion to strike the testimony of Detective David Bremmer
as being borne out of circumstances that are impermissibly
suggestive (See R. 61-62, Motion to Strike Testimony of Detective
Dave Bremer [sic] Regarding Voice Identification). The trial
court erred by failing to rule on the motion.
20

Officer John Carter, one of the people present during the
aforementioned conference, testified on cross-examination that
Detective Bremmer asked the individuals, in unison, whether they
could identify the voice on the tapes as that of Joey Silva (See,
e.g.,

id.

at R. 172, p. 441, lines 16-25).

Further, as the tapes

were played, there were verbal comments and nodding of heads by
the individuals at the conference, affirming that the voice on
the tapes was that of Joey Silva (See id.

at R. 172, pp. 443-

444) .
Detective John Fielding, another witness utilized by the
State at trial to identify the voice of Mr. Silva, was presented,
prior to trial, with various tapes by Detective Bremmer that
allegedly contained the voice of Mr. Silva (See id.
453-454).

at R. 172, p.

According to Detective Fielding's testimony, the tapes

presented to Detective Fielding for voice identification purposes
contained notations on the tapes, "Conversations involving Joey
Silva" (See id.

at R. 172, p. 454, lines 1-9).

In fact,

Detective Fielding essentially acknowledged during his testimony
that the notations on the tapes suggested that the voice on the
tapes was that of Mr. Silva (See id.

at R. 172, p. 455, lines 19-

23) .
Another witness utilized by the State to identify the voice
cf Mr. Silva at trial was Officer Bob Yeaman (See, e.g.,
21

id.

at

R. 172, p. 475, lines 12-15) .

Officer Yeaman was also present

during the identification conference at the Davis County
Attorney's Office (See id.

at R. 172, p. 482-83).

During his

testimony outside the presence of the jury, Officer Yeaman
testified that the individuals present during the conference made
several unfettered unanimous comments while listening to the
tapes such as, W[T]hat's Joey" (See id.

at R. 172, p. 483-84).

Additionally, Detective Lon F. Brian, who was also present
during the previously mentioned voice-identification conference,
was utilized by the State to identify the voice of Mr. Silva at
trial (See R. 173, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, pp. 579-600).
During his testimony outside the presence of the jury, Detective
Brian testified that he, prior to listening to the tapes, knew
that the investigation of Detective Bremmer focused on Joey Silva
(See id.

at R. 173, p. 509, lines 9-24).

The State also utilized the voice-identification testimony
of Detective Joel Morrison at trial, who was also present at the
voice-identification conference at the Davis County Attorney's
Office (See id.

at R. 173, pp. 604-08).

Detective Morrison

testified to the trial court that during the voice-identification
conference, which included the prosecutor and essentially all of
the law enforcement witnesses in the instant case, all of the
individuals at the conference talked amongst themselves in the
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course of making the requested voice identification (See id.

at

R. 173, 4-16).
According to the standards set forth in Ramirez,
Long,

Lopez,

and

for that matter, the numerous voice-identifications of the

law enforcement officers in the instant case are constitutionally
unreliable and impermissibly suggestive.

See State

817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long,

v.

Ramirez,
721 P.2d

483, 493 (Utah 1986)); State v.

Lopez,

1994) (quoting State v.

111 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989)).

Thamer,

886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah

Further, the voice-identifications of substantially all of the
State's witnesses at trial were tainted by the conference held in
the Davis County Attorney's Office.

Consequently, under the

facts of this case, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to
hear the voice-identification testimony of the aforementioned law
enforcement witnesses.

II.

BY FAILING TO REQUEST A CAUTIONARY JURY
INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE EARWITNESS TESTIMONY THAT
ACCURATELY REFLECTS AND ADVISES THE JURY ABOUT THE
FACTORS OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AS
SET FORTH IN State v. Long, APPOINTED TRIAL
COUNSEL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052

(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong
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test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment4 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 1064.

Id.

at 687, 104

Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To

prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant."

Bundy

(Utah 1988); see also

v.

1998); accord

State

State v. Frame,

State

v. Templin,

v.

Chacon,

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805

962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah

805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990);

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

v.

v.

Perry,

Wright,

893

*[T]he right to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial."

Lockhart

v.

Fretwell,

506 U.S.

364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant
must

ux

identify the acts or omissions' which, under the

circumstances,

x

show that counsel's representation fell below an

4

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
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objective standard of reasonableness.'"
(quoting Strickland,

denied,

805 P.2d at 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066,

2064 (footnotes omitted); see also
(quoting Parsons

Templin,

v.

Barnes,

Chacon,

962 P.2d at 50

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert.

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)).

A defendant must

''overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
cert, denied,

State v.

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989),

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons,
at 405.

805 P.2d

Strickland,

4 66 U.S. at

871 P.2d at 522; Frame,

723 P.2d

In the process of arriving at this determination, the

appellate court ''should consider the totality of the evidence,
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the
entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how
strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
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Templin,

805

P.2d at 187; see

also

State

v.

Hovater,

914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah

1996) .
In State

v. Long,

721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme

Court set forth and discussed the requisite cautionary jury
instruction to be utilized in cases where eyewitness
identification is the central issue.

Id.

at 492, 494 n.8.

The

purpose of such a cautionary instruction is to advise the jury of
the factors to be considered in course of evaluating eyewitness
identification testimony.

Id.

at 492.

The jury instruction utilized in the instant case concerning
the voice-identification testimony utilized at trial is deficient
in many aspects (See R. 103-04, Jury Instruction No. 26). For
example, the jury instruction in the instant case failed to
emphasize that the burden is on the State to prove that the
Defendant is the person who committed the crime.
P.2d at 494-95 n.8; see

also

State

v. Ramirez,

See Long,

817 P.2d 774, 781

(Utah 1991) (affirmatively citing footnote 8 of State
the cautionary jury instruction).

721

v.

Long as

The jury instruction in the

instant case also fails to list the numerous factors to be
considered by the jury in determining whether the witness had the
capacity to observe or hear the person committing the crime.
Long,

721 P.2d at 494 n.8 (citing "personal motivations, biases,
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or prejudices" and whether the witness is of a "different race"
as factors to be considered).
Appointed trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary
jury instruction that advised the jury of the concerns
surrounding voice-identification testimony similar to those of
eyewitness testimony fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment.

Appointed trial counsel's

ineffective assistance of counsel is underscored by trial
counsel's own arguments throughout the proceedings that
eyewitness identification testimony is similar to voice
identification testimony such as that in the instant case
e.g.,

R. 172r Vol. II, pp. 428-29).

(See,

Moreover, the trial court,

throughout his consideration of the admissibility of the voiceidentification testimony, analogized voice-identification
testimony to that of eyewitness identification testimony (See,
e.g.,

id.

at R. 172, p. 436, lines 7-10).

Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely request a
cautionary jury instruction similar to that set forth in Long
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment.5

But for trial counsel's deficient performance of

5

The failure to request a cautionary jury instruction is
exacerbated by the fact that voice identification was the central
issue in the instant case. See State
v. Long, 7321 P.2d 483, 492
(Utah 1986) .
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failing to request such a cautionary instruction, Mr. Silva would
have had the opportunity to have the jury consider the numerous
factors that should be considered in evaluating voiceidentification testimony.

Further, appointed trial counsel's

failure violates Mr. Silva's due process rights under article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

III. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
ESCAPE INASMUCH AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT TRIAL TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT THAT DEFENDANT
ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE OFFICIAL CUSTODY WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION.
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a
jury trial, the appellate court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the verdict and "assumes the jury believed the evidence and
inferences that support the verdict."
70, 87 (Utah 1993); see also
(Utah 1992); State v.

Fisher,

State

State

v. Hamilton,

v. Wood, 868 P.2d
827 P.2d 232, 233

972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah Ct. App.

1998).

In other words, the appellate court will affirm the jury

verdict

w/

if there is some evidence, including reasonable

inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made.'"
(quoting State

v. Booker,

Wood, 868 P.2d at 87-88

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985));
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see

also

State

denied,

v.

Hall,

946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert.

953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998).

When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a
"x [d]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient.'"

State v Hayes,

1993) (quoting State v.
L992), cert, denied,

Vigil,

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App.
840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App.

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).

In the instant

case, Mr. Silva must marshal all of the evidence in support of
the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then
persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the
State failed to prove that he was a was guilty of Attempted
Escape.
1991).

See

State

v.

Scheel,

823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App.

"Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or

supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."

See

State

v. Workman,

852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah

1993) (noting that the State's argument that "speculative
inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to
attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its
core").
As set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309, "A person is
guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without
29

authorization."

Attempt and its classification as an offense is

set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (1999) & Utah Code Ann. §
76-4-102 (Supp. 1999).
The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the
jury's verdict that Defendant was guilty of Attempted Escape:
(1) The testimony by Judge Glen R. Dawson concerning the amount
of Mr. Silva's bail (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp.
30-35) ; (2) The testimony of Detective David Bremmer, the lead
investigator, concerning his investigation of the case {See

id.

at R. 171, pp. 185-89) ; (3) The testimony of Officer Bob Yeaman
re procedures and related matters concerning the jail, including
his voice-identification of Mr. Silva (See id.

at R. 171, pp. 41-

141); (4) The testimony of the Slaughs concerning the alleged
scheme concerning posting of bail for Mr. Silva (See R. 172,
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 249-317); (5) The voiceidentification testimony of the numerous law enforcement
witnesses both outside and in the presence of the jury (See R.
passim);

in

and (6) the testimony of the bail bond company owner and

representative concerning the alleged efforts to post bail on
behalf of Mr. Silva (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp.
143-83; R. 173, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, pp. 622-41).
Even when the aforementioned evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, there is not even some
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evidence to establish or support the element that Mr. Silva
attempted to leave official custody without authorization of the
jail.

Moreover, the State's evidence establishes that the

alleged bond that was to be posted was in fact to be in the name
of Joey Silva (See id.

at R. 171, p. 160, lines 8-18; see

also

R.

171 at p. 162, lines 16-23) (bond company representative stating
that he obtained booking sheet for Joey Silva to post bail bond).
In light of record and evidence presented at trial, there is
insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction of
Attempted Escape.
As is established by the foregoing evidence at trial, the
State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as
it is required to do.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.6

A review

of the evidence supporting the Attempted Escape conviction leads

'Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the* offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words
"elements of the offense'7 mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or
forbidden in the definition of the
offense; or
(b) The culpable mental state
required.
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one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's conviction is
based on conjecture or supposition, which does not constitute
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reversal of the Attempted

Escape conviction for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore
appropriate in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Silva respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his conviction of Communications Fraud and
Attempted Escape and for such other relief as the Court deems
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this
case and arguments set forth herein.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Mr. Silva requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel and
apparent issues of first impression in the instant appeal dealing
with voice-identification testimony.

Further, oral argument will

assist the court in addressing the other issue concerning
insufficiency of evidence supporting Defendant's conviction of
Attempted Escape and the constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel.

These issues present matters requiring

further development in the area of criminal law for the benefit
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of the bar and public.

Counsel for Mr. Silva also requests that

the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion
designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for purposes
of precedential value and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 2 000
01LD SNWIGGINS,

P.C.

Wigcptns
Attorney£^£oy Defendant
Appellant
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Tab A

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300

MAR 17 10 33 ail'99
Ot \

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 981701362

vs .
JOEY LUIS SILVA
AKA PAUL DANFORTH,
Defendant.

Hon. Darwin C. Hansen, Judge

The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the
16th day of November, 1998, the defendant being present in person
and represented by his attorney, Laura Thompson, the State being
represented by Carvel R. Harward, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen,
Judge, presiding.
The defendant having been convicted upon a verdict of
guilty of the offenses of Communications Fraud, a second degree
felony, and Attempted Escape, a

class A misdemeanor, and the Court

having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment
should not be pronounced; and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court;
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the
offenses of Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, and

Attempted Escape, a class A misdemeanor, as charged and convicted.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of
one to fifteen years for the felony, and one year in the Davis
County

Jail

to be

served

at the Utah State

Prison

for the

misdemeanor, as provided by law.
Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court
on

the

16th

day

of November,

1998, the

transported to the Utah State Prison.
Court

that

the

sentence

herein

defendant

has been

It is recommended by the

ordered

for

count

one

run

consecutively with any other charges at the Utah State Prison and
that count two run concurrently with count one.

DATED this / /

day of

" //£/A>Wi/

1998

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment
this
day of
, 1998, to Laura Thompson,
Attorney for Defendant.

TabB

INSTRUCTION NO.

One of the most important questions in this case is the identification of the defendant as
the person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the
person who committed the crime. If after considering all of the evidence, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must
find the defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or
impression by the witnesses.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the
prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
committed the crime, you should consider the following factors in evaluating the testimony of
each individual witness:
1.

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to hear the criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a.

The length of time the witness heard the actor,

b.

The distance between the witness and the actor,

c.

Whether the observation was face-to-face, or otherwise,

d.

The presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the

time spent listening to the actor,
e.

Any physical impairments of the witness affecting his/her ability to

hear, and

f.

Whether the capacity of the witness to listen and hear the actor was

impaired by nervousness, fright, confusion, stress, or any other factor.
2.

Was the witness identification of the defendant completely the product of his/her
memory?

In answering this question, you should consider:
a.

The length of time that passed between the witness' original hearing of the

actor's voice and his/her identification of the defendant,
b.

The witness' mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the

identification,
c.

The witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or identifications given by

other witnesses, to other accounts, or to any other circumstance or influence that
may have affected the independence of his/her identification,
d.

Any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor's voice

that is inconsistent with the defendant's voice, and
e.

The circumstances under which the defendant's voice was presented to the

witness for identification.
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